

83-3057/1

17 JUN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Narcotics Intelligence Collection Program

I fear the attached misses the point. I find it hard to believe that with all of the contact between our military people and foreign military personnel who are often up to their ears in narcotics trafficking, that DIA cannot come up with more helpful intelligence in the narcotics arena. It appears obvious that DIA is not seized with the priority that the President places on narcotics. Would you please follow up on this and ensure that they are exploiting all possible information for intelligence on the important topic of narcotics?

John N. McMahon

Attachment:
Ltr to DDCI from D/DIA
dtd 13 Jun 83; Same Subject
(ER 83-3057)

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13 JUN 1983

C-1533/OS-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Narcotics Intelligence Collection Program (U)

1. (U) Executive Order 12333 outlines the primary responsibilities of DIA as the collection, production, or provision through tasking and coordination of "military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies." Unlike the Services, DIA has no specific responsibility under Executive Order 12333 for "information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking." At DIA, the collection and production of military intelligence therefore take precedence.
2. (C/NF) While concentrating on its primary mission, DIA reports promptly any information of interest to non-Defense agencies collected as a by-product of DIA operations. Several years ago, DIA established a close working relationship with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), to which our Office of Security passes information under provisions of DoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials." The DoD Directive encourages DoD components "to provide to federal, state, or local civilian law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of military operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials." (Emphasis added.) DoD Directive 5525.5 "does not permit the planning or creation of missions or training for the primary purpose of aiding civilian law enforcement officials" Considering the responsibilities assigned to DIA by Executive Order 12333 and the requirements of DoD Directive 5525.5, I believe DIA now cooperates with the law enforcement community on matters relating to narcotics intelligence to the maximum extent permitted by Executive Order, DoD policy, and the priority DIA must give to the collection and production of military intelligence in support of the national security.
3. (C/NF) DIA recognizes the urgency and global implications of the problem of narcotics and illicit drugs. We support efforts of the Intelligence Community to improve narcotics intelligence collection and production by the more efficient use of available community resources. We have initiated changes reflecting the higher intelligence collection priorities of DCID 1/2 in a revision of our worldwide Continuing Intelligence Requirement (CIR D-RSS-49431). Our CIR on narcotics establishes specific requirements and provides guidance to DoD collectors. We have also taken action to establish a new requirements category in the Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning (IPSP) concerning the effects of narcotics and illicit drug production and

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trafficking on military preparedness in target countries. Our Attache Training Department at the Defense Intelligence College since early 1982 has invited guest lecturers from DEA to address students on the subject of narcotics and illicit drugs. In a reciprocal program, DEA invites members of the Attache Training Department to DEA-sponsored seminars, at which DEA officials are made aware of the capabilities and limitations of the Defense Attache Offices as collectors of narcotics intelligence.

4. (C/NF) I am concerned that recent efforts to intensify narcotics intelligence collection and production by DIA could degrade or divert resources from DIA's primary mission. Much interest is focussed on attaches. Considering their representational duties, they are able to devote only about 50 percent of their time to collecting and reporting intelligence. They must therefore pay careful attention to the priority of each collection requirement assigned to them for action. In this regard, I note that Priority 3 is the highest assigned to any narcotics topic in the current version of "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities," prepared in response to DCID 1/2. The total number of Priority 3 and 4 scores assigned to narcotics-related topics is less than two percent of the total number of Priority 3 and 4 scores worldwide.

5. (C/NF) I doubt that establishing an analytical element within DIA, as you propose we do, would improve our contribution to the Intelligence Community effort. During 1982, DIA received only 91 reports concerning narcotics and illicit drugs. Sixty percent of those reports came from the Services; forty percent from DIA collectors. Considering the low volume of narcotics intelligence reported by these collectors, the expenditure of resources to establish a narcotics intelligence analysis element is not likely to result in any measurable advantage and could not be fiscally justified. Other agencies and departments more directly concerned with combatting narcotics and illicit drugs have a much broader base of reporting to analyze. Besides, the focus of narcotics-related priorities is primarily on Third World areas, where DIA analytical capabilities are limited.

6. (C/NF) As to the suggestion that a DIA analytical component could investigate "implications of the narcotics threat for the security of NATO military installations, and the military effectiveness of NATO troops," analysts in the Western Division of our Directorate for Research are already hard-pressed to respond to requirements for analysis of military intelligence. The low volume of reporting on narcotics and NATO ("almost nothing"), and our reluctance to divert resources from more urgently required analytical projects militate against the proposal. The narcotics threat to NATO is not so great as to require the diversion of resources and personnel from other analytical efforts more vital to the national security.

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7. (C/NF) DIA will continue its active participation with other elements of the Intelligence Community to improve the efficiency of narcotics intelligence collection and production and to enhance our collective support to the law enforcement community. We have accepted a portion of the National HUMINT Collection Plan (NHCP) that we consider appropriate for Defense Attaches to undertake within their capability. We intend to continue our close cooperation with DEA and other non-Defense agencies directly involved in the struggle against narcotics. We will continue furnishing promptly and to the appropriate agency narcotics intelligence acquired as a by-product of military intelligence collection.



JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

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